

**SECRET**

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HEADQUARTERS  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MAR 23 1960

ACSI-IWM

*Reed by DCS*  
*J. S. [unclear]*

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE CHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Assessment of the Military Situation in the Union of South Africa (U)

**\*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File\***

1. (U) In response to your request at USIB, 22 March 1960, I am pleased to furnish you the following assessment of the military situation in the Union of South Africa.
2. (S/NR) The well-trained, well-equipped and effective security forces in the Union of South Africa consist of a police force of 22,000; an army of 2,500; the Citizen Force (Army National Guard) of 14,000; an air force of 2,900; and a navy of 3,000. The police force has primary responsibility for maintenance of internal security.
3. (C) While this total force seems relatively small compared to the total population (3,000,000 European and 11,000,000 native), it has proven effective in maintaining security and rapidly restoring order following past disorders. This stems largely from the fact that the native population is unarmed and lacking in central leadership for planning and control. Additionally, the majority of the native population lives in widespread pastoral and agricultural areas far from white population centers and remains unaware of, and disinterested in, political or racial problems.
4. (C) Organized uprisings have occurred only in the vicinity of industrial centers where the detribalized native laborer has been influenced by the recently formed (December 1959) Pan-Africanist Congress (claiming 31,000 members) and the less militant and smaller African National Congress.
5. (C) Currently, South African security forces are believed capable of containing, but not preventing, isolated disturbances, riots, or uprisings. However, an organized insurrection consisting of resistance in large numbers over widespread areas would seriously tax the capability of security forces as presently constituted. The current disturbance, which reflects the influence of younger, more radical leaders, is the most severe outbreak in many years and may indicate a turning point in leadership and organization among native movements.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED  
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AUTHORITY OF *Admiral*  
*1960 65*

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6. (C) Even with better leadership and increased organization, these native elements must acquire substantial arms before they would pose a serious threat to the government. We have no information indicating they have an ability to acquire such arms in significant quantities. Thus, barring unforeseen developments, we believe the capability of the natives to seriously threaten the internal security of the country over the short term is limited.

*John M. Willems*

JOHN M. WILLEMS  
Major General, GS  
ACofS for Intelligence

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